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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JANET R. COX,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

.vs.
Civil NO. 904402060
K. NORMAN COX,
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court for trial on August 31,
1992.

Plaintiff appeared in person and by counsel, Gary H.

Weight, Esq.

Defendant appeared in person and by counsel,

Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq. and Richard L. Peel, Esq.
presented a Stipulation to the Courr.

The parties

The Courr proceeded to

hear the matter on its merits and now enters the following:

>1 ~
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that Plaintiff meets the residency

requirements of the divorce statutes of the State of Utah.
2.

The Court finds that the parties have experienced

irreconcilable differences, such that Plaintiff should be awarded
a decree of divorce.
3.

The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendanr were

married for fewer than three years.

From the day they were

married, July 1, 1988, to the-date of their final separation,
December 1, 1990, the parties were only married for twenty-nine
months.

Of the twenty-nine month marriage, the parties

experienced a brief trial separation of five months.
4.

The Court finds that at the time of their marriage,

Plaintiff was 47 years old and Defendant was 56 years old.
was Plaintiff's third marriage and Defendant's second.

This

No

children were born into the marriage.
5.

The Court finds that in 1966, Defendant built a house

at 773 South 400 East, Orem, Utah, 84058.

Defendanr raised nine

children in this house and paid off a twenty year VA mortgage
sometime in 1987.

At the time of the parries' marriage, July l,

1988, the property was unencumbered by mortgage or lien.

2
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The Court finds that prior to the parties' marriage,

Plaintiff sold her separate residence against the advise of
Defendant, and her brother-in-law, an accountant.

From the

$21,000 proceeds of the that sale, Plaintiff repaid her parents
the $18,000 she had borrowed from them to purchase the home.
7.

The Court finds that prior to the marriage, Plaintiff

had a net worth of $74,000. Plaintiff's $74,000 net worth
included the $18,000 she repaid to her parents. The Court finds
that Defendant had a net worth, of $368,000.
8.

The Court finds that prior to the marriage, the parties

executed an Antenuptial Agreement.

Plaintiff executed the

Antenuptial Agreement on June 28, 1988 and Defendant executed the
Antenuptial Agreement on June 30, 1988.

Defendant intended for

his premarital assets, including his personal home, to be
protected under the provisions of the Antenuptial Agreement, and
Plaintiff had knowledge of Defendant's intent to protect his
personal home.

Under the provisions of the Antenuptial

Agreement, the parties contractually retained the right to
dispose of their separate property by commingling such assets or
otherwise.
9.

The Court finds that nearly contemporaneous with the

parties' signing of the Antenuptial Agreement, Defendant executed
3
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a Warranty Deed granting Plaintiff a joint interest in his
premarital home.
10.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's attorney in 1988, Doug

Nielsen, advised and counseled the parties regarding the
execution of the Antenuptial Agreement and Warranty Deed.

Mr.

Nielsen drafted the Antenuptial Agreement and Warranty Deed.
Defendant's attorney, Phil Ivie, was not present at any of the
meetings held between the parties and Mr. Nielsen.

Mr. Nielsen

did not send the Warranty Deed^to Mr. Ivie, for his review, nor
did Mr. Nielsen speak with Mr. Ivie at any time regarding the
Warranty Deed.
11.

The Court finds that the provisions of the Warranty

Deed are patently incompatible with the protection provision of
the Antenuptial Agreement.

The Antenuptial Agreement was clearly

intended by the parties to protect their separate property.

That

is precisely why they sought the services of an attorney.
Clearly, the Warranty Deed was an afterthought by the parties.
12.

The Court finds the value of Defendant's home prior to

marriage and prior to the remodeling was $77,000.00.

The Court

finds that Plaintiff expended $18,062.65 for remodeling of
Defendant's premarital home (of this amount $9,005.55 was spent
by Plaintiff prior to the marriage and prior to the execution of
4
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the Antenuptial Agreement).

The Courr finds that Plaintiff

received $5,500 from Defendant as reimbursement: of the amounts
expended by her.

The Court finds that Plaintiff expended

$12,562.65 and that Defendant spent $11,931.00 on the remodeling.
13.

The Court finds that the fair market value of

Defendant's premarital home at the time of the parties'
separation was $105,Q00.00.

Defendant's premarital home did not

increase in value as a result of Plaintiff's remodeling
expenditures.

The value of Defendant's premarital home in 1988

plus the amount of monies the parties paid toward the remodeling
or $106,993.65, exceeds the $105,000 fair market value of the
home.
14.

The Court finds that both parties liquidated separate

assets and invested them in the marriage.

The Court finds

Plaintiff expended $74,000.00 during marriage, of which Plaintiff
paid in excess of $3 0,000 to her children.

The Court finds

Defendant expended $109,114.45 during the marriage.
15.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's net worth at the time

of separation was $10,53 9.00 and Defendant's net worth at the
time of separation was $232,249.

Plaintiff's net decrease was

$63,461 and Defendant's net decrease was $135,709.

5
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16.

The Court finds that the parties should be awarded the

personal property as it has been divided between the parties.
The Court finds that Defendant should pay the remaining debt owed
to Zion's First National Bank, which was incurred in February,
1989; the proceeds of which were used for the acquisition of
personal property.
17.

The Court finds that expenditures made by either party

prior to the marriage, July 1, 1988 (but for the remodeling
costs), or after the separation date, December l, 199 0, are not
claimed, at issue, or reimbursable.
18.

The Court finds that Defendant paid to Plaintiff

$10,725.00 during the marital period.

This amount includes the

$5,500 amount Defendant paid to Plaintiff to reimburse her for
her remodeling costs.
19.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's current gross monthly

income is $1,850.00 and Defendant's current gross monthly income
from unemployment compensation is $554.00 per month.

Defendant's

historical income is irrelevant because of his sale of his
business and because his physical disability precludes him from
seeking full-time employment in his area of training; autobody
repair.

6
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20.

The Court finds that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant

are able to meet their respective financial obligations.

Both

parties suffered significant financial reversals during the very
short marriage and Defendant's ability to pay alimony is clearly
lacking.
21.

The Court finds that Defendanr proffered a $24,000

Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff on or about August 12, 1992, which
Plaintiff declined to accept.

Subsequent to August 12, 1992,

Defendant incurred $4,649 in attorneys fees and costs.
22.

The Court finds that Defendant should be awarded all

right, title and interest in all real property he brought into
the marriage, including his premarital home and other personal
properties not otherwise awarded to Plaintiff.
23.

The Court finds that Plaintiff should be awarded all

rights, title and interest she has in and to her retirement.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff should be awarded a decree of divorce from

and against Defendant, the same to become final and absolute upon
signing by the Court and entry by the Clerk in the Registry of
Actions.
7
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2.

Plaintiff should be awarded the personal property she

presently has in her possession.

Defendant should be awarded the

personal property he presently has in his possession.
3.

Defendant should be ordered to pay the debt owing to

Zion's First National Bank, which was incurred in February of
1989.

Each party should be ordered to pay all debts he or she

incurred prior to their marriage, July 1, 1988 (but for the
remodeling costs) or after the separation date of 12/1/90 (but
for Defendant's attorneys fees, and costs incurred subsequent to
8/12/92)•
4.

Defendant should be ordered to reimburse Plaintiff for

her pre-marriage and post marriage expenditures for remodeling
Defendant's premarital home, located at 773 South 400 East, Orem,
Utah, in the stipulated amount of $12,562.65.
5.

Defendant should be awarded legal title and possession

of all real property he brought into the marriage, including his
personal home located at 773 South 400 East, Orem, Utah and all
personal property not otherwise awarded to Plaintiff.
6.

Plaintiff should be ordered to immediately reconvey to

Defendant by quit claim deed, title to Defendant's premarital
home located at 773 South 400 East, Orem, Utah.

8
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7.

Plaintiff should be awarded all rights, title and

interest she has in her retirement and savings.
8.

Plaintiff is not entitled to alimony.

9.

Plaintiff should be ordered to pay Defendant's

attorneys fees and costs incurred subsequent to August 12, 1992
in the amount of $4,649; $2,3 60 for the legal services of Richard
L. Peel, Esq-, and $2,239 for legal services rendered by Marilyn
Moody Brown, Esq.
10.

Plaintiff is entitled to restoration of her maiden

name.
Let a decree be entered accordingly.
DATED this ^?<^ day of October, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

9
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Gary
Weight, Esq., attorney for Plaintiff, at Aldridge, Nelson, Weight
& Esplin, Post Office Box L, Provo, Utah 34603 this

day of

October, 1992.

10
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Nevada State Bar #4359
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Attorneys for Defendant K. NORMAN COX
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JANET R. COX,
DECREE OP DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil NO. 904402060

K. NORMAN COXf
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for trial on August 31,
1992.

The Plaintiff appeared in person and by counsel, Gary H.

Weight, Esq.

The Defendant appeared in person and by counsel,

Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq. and Richard L. Peel, Esq.
presented a Stipulation to the Court.

The parties

The Courr proceeded to

hear the matter on its merits and having heretofore entered its

-

1

-
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lawf now enters the
following:
DECREE OP DIVORCE
1.

Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from and

against the Defendant, the same to become final and absolute upon
signing by the Court and entry of the Clerk in the Registry of
Actions.
2.

Plaintiff is awarded the personal property she

presently has in her possession.
3.

Defendant is awarded the personal property he presently

has in his possession.
4.

Defendant is ordered to pay the debt owing to Zion's

First National Bank, which was incurred in February of 1989.
Each party is ordered to pay his or her own debts incurred prior
to the marriage, July 1, 1988 (but for the remodeling costs), or
after the separation date, December 1, 1990.
5.

Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff within sixty (60)

days from the date of this decree, Plaintiff's pre-marriage and
post marriage remodeling expenditures, in the stipulated amount
of $12,562.65.
6.

Defendant is awarded all real property which he brought

into the marriage, including his personal home located at 773
- 2 -

lib
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South 400 Eastf Orem, Utah, and all personal property not
otherwise awarded
7.

11 i .o n.

Plaintiff Is ordered to immediately reconvey to

Defendant by quiz 3iaim deed, -ir!e -~ Defendant's premari**-1
home located
8.

Plaint..:i _. ^warded

... ricrnz, title and interest she

has in her retirement and savings.
9.

F1

10.

^ ^ x w L . r : ^o ^rdered^to pay within sixty (60) days

'> , ,

ienied.

the date of this Decree, Defendant's attorneys fees and costs
incurred subsequen
t

ichard Peel, Esq-

,.-,- 0

fc

...^ ^ , .. -

•.::.;:. Moody Brown, Esq.

Defendant may ^r nis :~~ \ z:\ m*: -r/ permission ^r '-:: :rtorne^
deduct such

.~~ * •-

_ , _ _ _ .;^ ^s

ordered t.c ^ay Plaintiff.
Let a decree be entered accordingly.
DATED this

Z&

""•

>it i .I..-L

1-2.

BY THE QeURT:

•district (four

^

•U

'••A .

#
5;o"e»«oo«'rc

P 1 '7

APPROVED AS TO FOPM:
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j

-
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APPENDIX "C"
Memorandum Decision
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
ilh BOUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH

DECISION

JANET K, t"(JX,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 904402060

K. NORMAN m \
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendant.

This matter came before the court

The plaintiff

appeared in person and by counsel, Gary H. Weight, Esq. The defendant appeared in person
and by counsel, Marilyn Moor

and Richard Peel, Esq. The parties presented

a stipulation and made opening arguments
fair and nnuuhlr

LIIVIMI'II

,'t ,iy;i:t:»

JJILI I

At issue was (1) the award of

IMMIMNU I ;

| iiie

JI the award of attorney's fees. Evidence was taken

and the matter was taken under advisement. The court received a supplemental
-:—o-

:ienaant and both parties submitted proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law. This court has fully considered ihr i'\ iclrii.1.

iwi'iin .r^jida submitted by

111 J 11 :»c i . i J i d () i";ij argument.
The court, being fully advised in thr premises, no w enters its:

1

RULING
I. ALIMONY
Plaintiff seeks alimony in this case. The court will consider three factors in
determining an award of alimony: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or
herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Burt v. Burt. 799
P.2d 1166 (Ut.App. 1990).
A.

Facts.

In this case, the defendant sold his busmess after the separation of the parties. He
had some employment with Utah Valley Community College but has not been able to renew
his contract. He presently receives temporary unemployment compensation of $554.00 per
month and is seeking gainful employment. Those unemployment benefits commenced the
second week of July and will continue for twenty-six weeks. His historical earnings prove to
be $1,457.00 per month and his earnings at UVCC were $17.65 per hour for approximately
15 hours per week. In addition, he receives $500.00 per month from the sale of his
business. He suffers from a physical disability, necessitating knee operations. He cannot
afford the operation which, if performed, would lay him up for six months. He borrows
between $500.00 to $600.00 per month from his children in order to meet his financial
obligations.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, earns $1,850.00 gross income and receives $1,134.00 net
2

income ilLcx deductions for taxes and retirement and savings accounts. Even the plaintiff
recognizes that the present circumstances nl" lime panics <li

I H Cm u> compel an award of

alimony to the plaintiff. The defendant's ability to pay alimony is clearly lacking at the
present time. His historic'

oecause of his sale of his business and

because his physical disability now precludes him from seeking jobs in his area of training;
autobody rpp-'iii
It is important to note that plaintiff has enrolled in an Executive Masters
rnhhi Viiinuustraciuii iJirough Brigham Young University. That executive program is
conducted at night and will not interfere with her employment

ung

will pay plaintiffs full tuition, but not associated costs.
It is clear from the evidence that neither "

meet respective financial

obligations. The plaintiff, since separation, has purchased a condominium and encumbered
herself with a mortgage. Defenrnni lu\ nild -iff Numerous personal items, a gun collection,
snowmobiles, cars, etc in attempting to finance the marriage. He also assumed new
during the marriage. Most niarkeuiblc personal items have been sold.
Decision
A Burt v. Bun, it is clear that the financial conditions and needs
of both parties are deplorable. The plaintiff has enrolled

\

inn paio nnniiiau.' pruyram

nil ilic lujpei) tit bettering her financial position. Defendant currently has no such
opportunity. Defendant has no current employ
3

*

„

. ._ disabilities, no

reasonably foreseeable ability to obtain employment and to pay alimony. The marriage is of
a very short duration and both parties suffered significant financial reversals during the
marriage. Accordingly, no alimony award is merited.
H. PROPERTY DIVISION
A.

Facts

The parties married on July 1, 1988, in South Jordan, Utah. At marriage, plaintiff
was 47 years old and defendant was 56 years old. Their marriage was the third for the
plaintiff and second for the defendant. There were no children as issue of the marriage.
The marriage is of short duration (29 montfis), including a 5 month trial separation.
The financial declarations of both parties support the fact that this marriage was a financial
disaster for both parties.
The parties stipulated to various facts which affect property settlement matters and the
court adopts the following:
1.

Remodeling costs. The amount spent on remodeling by plaintiff was a total of

$18,062.65 (of this amount $9,005.55 was spent by plaintiff in remodeling prior to the
marriage and prior to the execution of the antenuptial agreement). Plaintiff received $5,500
from defendant as reimbursement of the amounts expended by her. Plaintiff spent
$12,562,65 for remodeling. Defendant spent approximately $11,931 on remodeling.
Remodeling was completed in order to accommodate the combination of the two families.
2.

Personal property. The personal property will be awarded to the parties as it
4

hi i«: iwn dn'ult,'i| defendant will assume the debt to Zion's First National Bank which was
incurred in February, 1989 by the parties and was used Lw thr .wquisition I Hie personal
. /-c

nach party will pay all other debts he or she incurred after the separation date of

12/1/90,
Expenditures prior to marriage and post separation. Expenditures made by
either party prior to il ,. iiaiTiape ibin im dm remodeling costs) or after the separation date
(December 1, 1990), are not claimed,-at issue, or reimbursable.
4,

/alue of separate property. The parties stipulate that the actual amounts that

should have been inserted in the antenuptial agreement for Norman
been$368 I KM I and the amount that should have been inserted in the antenuptial agreement for
Janet Cox was $74,000.
5,

Net worth of parties at time of separation. (The court chooses to accept the

appraisal of Timothy Campbell). Plaintiff

separation was $10,539.

Defendant's net worth at time of separation was $232,249. The plaintiffs net decrease was
563,461. The defendant's net dearer sv
6.

,r

" ^,; W .

Amount of cash given bv defendant to plaintiff. The amount of cash paid, to

the plaintiff .during the mar>

'•

defendant was $10,725 (inclusive of

reimbursement of remodeling costs).
7.

Expenditures by the parties. Plaintiffs expenditures during the marriage was

574,000. Additionally, plaintiff gave to her children
5

plaintiff paid to her children by check (some of which is included above) is $31,284.15.
Defendant's expenditures during the marriage were 5109,114.45.
8.

Current income. Plaintiffs current gross income is $1,850.00 per month.

Defendant's current unemployment compensation is $554.00 per month. The defendant's
historical income is $1457.00 per month.
9.

Cabin and retirement benefits. The plaintiff waives her claim for an interest in

defendant's cabin. The defendant waives his claim for an interest in plaintiffs retirement or
any other property belonging to plaintiff. The plaintiff waives any interest in defendant's
business or proceeds from the sale of business or any other property belonging to defendant.
Prior to marriage, the parties executed an antenuptial agreement and the defendant
intended for his premarital assets, including his personal home, to be protected under the
provisions of the antenuptial agreement. The plaintiff had knowledge of defendant's intent to
protect his personal home. The agreement was executed on June 30, 1988, two days prior to
the marriage. Nearly contemporaneous with the signing of the prenuptial agreement, (June
29, 1988), defendant executed a warranty deed granting plaintiff a joint interest in his
premarital home.
The protection provision of the antenuptial agreement is patently incompatible with
the provisions of the deed. Plaintiffs attorney in 1988, Doug Nielsen, advised and
counseled the parties regarding the execution of the antenuptial agreement and warranty
deed. Mr. Nielsen drafted the antenuptial agreement and the warranty deed. Defendant's
6

iiitornev, Phil I ne,, \ as uot present at any of the meetings held between the parties and Mr.
Nielsen. Mr. Nielsen did not send the warranty deed to Mr
Nielsen speak with Mr. Ivie at any time regarding the warranty deed. It is unclear from the
disparate testimony of the witnesses whether defend?

. sr he truly

intended to grant a joint interest to the plaintiff, irrespective of the mutually acknowledged
protection provision r.i tin* iiitnniDUal aiTieTknit
The defendant built the subject house in 1966, raised nine children there, and paid off
lj
hisrwmiv VVAI Y,\ murtgage ijonietiine in 1"»K
."

U the time of the marriage of the parties

In 1988, the property was unencumbered by mortgage or lien.
i the residence at separation was disputed, and the court accepts the more
professional appraisal of Mr. Timothy Campbell which established the
There ^ "«» dispute that the value of the subject premises at the time of the marriage was
577,000.00. •'
Just prior to the marriage, plaintiff sold her separate residence. There is evidence
that plaintiffs brother, an.accounta*

:.. • :

iuvised her to keep the home.

From the proceeds of that sale, plaintiff paid her parents $18,000.00. They, evidently had
loaned her .money to

\

i true that plaintiff liquidated her

home in anticipation of the marriage, it is also true that she had little equity "
'ii losmj1, iie * -v

. -...*. vas immediately paid to her

parents. It appears that plaintiffs net worth at the time she execm^i me pn'iuipruu
7

e.

agreement, $74,000, included the $18,000.00 which she repaid to her parents. Plaintiff
expended approximately $74,000.00 during the marriage. She liquidated some assets and
approximately $30,000.00 was given directly to her children during the marriage. In light of
the above, plaintiffs argument of detrimental reliance appears to lack foundation.
B.

DISCUSSION

The stipulation resolves all property disputes except for a consideration of the division
of defendant's premarital home. The prenuptial agreement protects defendant's interest and
the warranty deed purports to convey a one half interest to plaintiff. Article I of the
antenuptial agreement provides that each party's separate property and the proceeds thereof
would remain separate.
Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to a one half interest in the defendant's premarital
home. Defendant argues that plaintiff is only entitled to reimbursement for her pre and post
marriage remodeling cost, and any accrued valued. This court is more persuaded by
defendant's argument. The court adopts the following reasoning of defendant.
Utah court have held that disposition of property under an antenuptial agreement is
valid as long as there is no fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure. D'Aston v. D'Aston.
808 P.2d Lll (Ut.App. 1990); Berman v. Berman. 749 P.2d 1271 (Ut.App. 1988). The
antenuptial agreement the plaintiff executed on June 28, 1988, was validly executed and was
not subject to fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure. The parties entered into the
agreement upon plaintiffs request, her attorney drafted the agreement, the parties were
8

immMHii ilic agreement •< ,i. .1 1., signed and notarized, and as consideration therefore both
parties, separate property was protected. Additionally, plaintiffs own attorney signed the
jgreemeiii and certified that he consulted with plaintiff and advised her of her property rights
and the legal significance of the antenuptial agreement.
I He Utah Court of Appeals held that under the terms of an antenuptial agreement
where each party has relinquished all
party, he or she has no right to the other party's separate property nor any increase in value
that might nrmir rn t!ii,iil [uopiTt,', Rudman v. Rudman,, 812 P 2d 1 3, 1 3 ( U t.App, 1991);
Berman, 749 P.2d at 1271.l
oh courts have not directly addressed the question of whether a warranty
deed with rights of survivorship executed subsequent to an antenuptial agreement abrogates
jid provisions of the antenuptial agreement. However, other jurisdictions have

[

The Rudman court held that ,under the parties antenuptial
agreement, the husband's premarital property together with any
increase would remain the property of the husbandf in spite of
the fact that the-wife contributed labor and/or assets to the
property during marriage. Rudman, 812 P.2d at 78. In Berman,
the court overturned the lower court's order awarding the wife
one-half the equity in the husband's separate property home
purchased prior to marriage. The Berman court held that the
antenuptial agreement preserved the husband's house as his
separate property. The court based its reversal on evidence
presented at trial wherein the wife knowingly and voluntarily
entered the antenuptial agreement, no fraud or undue influence
induced the wife to sign the agreement and the agreement stated
that real property owned by the parties at the time of marriage
was to remain the separate property of each spouse. Berman, 74 9
P.2d at 1271.

9

confronted this very issue. In Peet v. Monger. 56 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1953), the parties
entered into an antenuptial agreement prior to their marriage. Subsequent to the parties'
execution of the antenuptial agreement, the wife executed a joint tenancy deed which
contained no language expressly affecting the cancellation of the antenuptial agreement. The
Iowa Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision by finding that, under the antenuptial
agreement, the husband had no interest in or control over the joint tenancy property unless he
survived the wife. See also In Re Marriage of Van Brocklin. 468 N.W.2d 40 (Iowa App.
1991).
In the case at hand, the warranty deed witiTrights of survivorship is void of language
expressly canceling the antenuptial agreement. In fact, the deed expressly states that the
deed is subject to all "existing covenants of whatever nature." Additionally, the antenuptial
agreement existed at the time the warranty deed was executed and plaintiff had knowledge
that the antenuptial agreement she executed on June 28, 1988 attempted to control and
preserve the same property covered by the warranty deed.
Plaintiff next argues that the antenuptial agreement was abrogated when the parties
liquidated and expended their separate property in support of the marriage. This argument is
baseless. Recital "E" of the antenuptial agreement expressly provides:
Each of the parties mutually desires to retain, manage or dispose separately by
gift, will or otherwise all of his or her estate to the same extent as if each of
such parties remained single.
Clearly, by executing the antenuptial agreement, the parties contractually retained the right to
10

dispose of their separate property by commingling such assets or otherwise.2
Accordingly, the antenuptial agreement was not abrogated as to defendant's separate
property which was not commingled or liquidated, and these assets are still protected under
the provisions of the antenuptial agreement.
The Utah Supreme Court has held on several occasions that a trial court is not bound
by the state of title to real property prior to the issuance of a divorce decree. Georgedes v.
Georgedes. 627 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1981); Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah
1980); Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980); Lundgreen v. Lundgreen.
184 P.2d 670 (Utah 1947). A trial court is empowered to make distributions as are just and
equitable and may compel such conveyances as are necessary to that end. Jackson. 617 P.2d
at 341.
In upholding the lower court's decision in Georgedes. 627 P.2d at 45, the Utah
Supreme Court held that it was equitable to return to the husband a home and business which
he had brought into the marriage, notwithstanding that title had been placed in joint tenancy.
According to the Georgedes court, the trial court's decree simply put the parties to a second

2

In Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166 (Ut.App. 1990), the Utah
Court of Appeals held that separate property loses its separate
character when the marital parties have inextricably commingled
the separate property with marital property or when they have
contributed all or part of the separate property to the marital
estate. See also Rudman, 312 P.2d at 78. The analysis of both
the Rudman and the Burt courts clearly indicates that separate
property may be transmuted by the parties into marital property
if such property cannot be traced to a separate property source.
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marriage of relatively short real duration back into sole ownership of the properties they
brought into the marriage. Id. at 45.
In upholding the lower court's decision in Jesperson. 610 P.2d at 328, the Utah
Supreme Court held that where the wife had used her separate property to purchase a mobile
home during marriage and even though the mobile home was held in joint tenancy and
substantially improved by the husband's labors, it was equitable for the lower court to award
her an amount equal to the value of the assets she brought into the marriage.
And, in a case which is factually similar to the case at hand, the Utah Supreme Court
in Lundgreen. held that a wife was only entitled to receive one-half the market value in
excess of the original purchase price of a home purchased during marriage with the
husband's separate assets, even though the home was held in joint tenancy and the wife had
contributed extensive labor and separate funds in remodeling the home. 184 P.2d at 672.3
In arguing that she is entitled to one-half the value of defendant's separate property
home, plaintiff relies on Hogue v. Hogue 831 P.2d 121 (UtApp. 1992). In Hogue, the sole
issue before the Utah Court of Appeals was whether a grantor spouse who conveyed his

3

A. common factual theme exists in the Georcredes, Jesperson
and Lundareen cases and the case at hand. In each situation, the
parties were married for less than seven years, no children were
born into the marriage, both parties had been married before, one
of the parties either brought a premarital home into the marriage
or the home was purchased with that party's separate funds, title
to the home w^s placed in joint tenancy within the first year of
marriage, and the other party allegedly contributed labor, income
and/or assets to remodel or improve the realty.
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entire interest in his separately owned real property, was entitled to a one-half interest in the
property upon the parties divorce. Plaintiffs reliance upon Hogue is misplaced.
The Hogue case is factually distinguishable from the facts of the Georgedes. Jesperson
and Lundgreen cases and the case at hand. In Hogue. the parties had been married for an
unspecified period of time, were divorced, then remarried. Subsequent to their remarriage,
In fact, Mr. Hogue transferred his entire interest in real property to his wife, as a means of
protecting the property from his judgment creditors. Unlike the case at hand, there was no
prenuptial agreement. The parties contracted for the purchase of additional acreage adjoining
the real property. The parties cohabitated together on the property prior to being remarried,
and the parties' second marriage lasted for over seven years. Lastly, the facts do not
indicate whether Mr. Hogue had asked the trial court for anything more than a one-half
interest in the property.
Utah courts have held that upon divorce, each party should retain the separate
property he or she brought into the marriage. Dunn v. Dunn. 802 ).2d 1314 (Ut.App.
1990). In making a property division, a trial court should take into consideration all the
pertinent circumstances of the parties' marriage. Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431,
432 (Utah 1982); Jackson. 617 P.2d at 338; English v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977).
The pertinent circumstances this court must consider are: (1) the duration of the
marriage; (2) the parties' ages at time of marriage and whether any children were born into
the marriage; (3) the" amount and kind of property to be divided, whether the property was
13

acquired before or during the marriage, and the source of the property; (4) the parties'
standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs and earning capacity; and (5) the
health of the parties. Hoeue. 831 P.2d 120 (Ut.App. 1992).
The court notes the following facts. First, the parties were married for fewer than
three years. From the day they were married, July 1, 1988, to the date of their final
separation, December 1, 1990, the parties were only married for twenty-nine months.
Additionally, during this twenty-nine month period the parties experienced a brief trial
separation of five months.
Second, plaintiff was 47 years old and defendant was 56 upon their marriage. The
marriage was plaintifPs third marriage and was defendant's second marriage. No children
were born into the marriage.
Third, the amount which plaintiff is seeking to obtain, $52,500 (one-half the value of
her 1990 appraisal on the home), substantially exceeds the monies she paid toward the
remodeling of the home, $12,500. This court takes into consideration the fact that defendant
has owned the property in question since 1966, and that at the time of marriage, the home
was free and clear of all encumbrances and liens.
The. home has special meaning to defendant since he has raised all nine of his children
in the home. If this court were to award plaintiff one-half the value of the home, defendant
would be forced to sell the home to reimburse plaintiff since he is unemployed.
Fourth, defendant is not in the same financial situation as he was prior to marriage.
14

Due to a slowdown in his business and because of his deteriorating health, defendant was
forced to sell his business. Defendant is currendy unemployed and is looking for work. On
the other hand, Plaintiff has been employed at all times relevant hereto at Brigham Young
University. Due to her younger age and higher salary, plaintiff has an opportunity to recoup
some of her losses while defendant's age and health may prevent him from securing steady
full-time employment. Plaintiffs wages have steadily increased during the marriage with
reasonable expectation that they will continue to do so.
Fifth, both parties liquidated substantial sums of their separate property assets and
incurred substantial debts and obligations during the marriage. While plaintiff may have
spent considerable sums during the marital period and incurred substantial debts an
obligations, not all her expenditures or debts went to the marital estate. In 1989, plaintiff
sold her major asset, the Monroe property. She immediately dispersed $24,000 to her
children. This dispersement constituted the most significant reduction of her net worth
during the marriage.
It appears that the .deed was also drafted and executed with some haste. The parties
were to married only three days after defendant executed the deed. The question that comes
to mind is why would the parties execute two completely conflicting documents unless one
was not anticipated or planned for by the parties? The antenuptial agreement was clearly
intended by the parties to protect their separate property. That is precisely why they sought
the services of an attorney. On the other hand, the warranty deed divested defendant of
15

fifty-percent of his ownership interest in his home. Clearly, the warranty deed was an
afterthought by the parties.
From the testimony of Mr. Nielson, counsel for plaintiff, it is not clear that he sent a
copy of the subject deed to Ray Ivie, counsel for defendant, for his review. This fact seems
to be substantiated by dates and notary acknowledgements of defendant's signature on the
warranty deed and the antenuptial agreement. Defendant's June 29, 1988, signature on both
the warranty deed and affidavit of surviving joint tenant was acknowledged by Mr. Nielson5s
notary, Cynthia Shumway, while defendant's June 30, 1988 signature on the antenuptial
agreement was acknowledge by Ivie & Young's notary, Lois Pinster. If the deed had been
sent over to Ivie & Young for their review, prior to the deed's execution, defendant's
signature would have been most likely notarized by Ivie & Young's notary as well.
Under the rationale of the Utah Supreme Court in Georgedes. Jesperson and
Lundgreen where one of the parties contributes separate property assets to remodel or
improve a home brought into the marriage by the other spouse, and title to the home is
placed in joint tenancy within the first year of marriage, it is equitable to return to the spouse
who contributed their separate property assets to remodel or improve the premarital house
that spouses actual remodeling expenditures plus one-half of the increase in value to the
property is such increase exists.
In the case at hand, the parties have stipulated that the value of defendant's premarital
home in 1988, prior to the marriage and any improvements was $77,0000. The court has
16

found that the home's value was $105,000.00 upon the parties separation on December 1,
1990. The parties stipulated that plaintiff contributed $12,562. 65 toward the remodeling of
defendant's home and that defendant expended $11,931.00 on the remodeling. In addition,
defendant reimbursed plaintiff $5,550.00 for remodeling costs.
Based on the foregoing, even though the court has determined that the value of
Defendant's premarital home upon the parties final separation was $105,000.00, this coun
finds that the home did not increase in value since the value of defendant's premarital home
in 1988 plus the amount of monies the parties paid toward the remodeling or $106,993.65,
exceeds the $105,000 appraised value of the home.4
C.

DECISION ON DIVISION OF PROPERTY

Plaintiff is not entitled to one-half of defendant's interest in the home and plaintiff has
no life estate. Taking into consideration all of the pertinent circumstances, it is just and
equitable that plaintiff convey title to the subject property to defendant.
Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for her actual pre-marriage and post marriage
expenditures for remodeling in the stipulated amount of $12,562.65. The balance of the

4

+

$77,000
$12,562.65

+

$5,500

+

$11,931

[value of home in 1988]
[value of plaintiff's remodeling
expenditures]
[amount defendant reimbursed plaintiff
for remodeling]
[value of defendant's remodeling
expenditures]

$106,993.65
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issues respecting personal property division and financial obligations are resolved by the
stipulation and appear just and equitable.
IE. ATTORNEY'S FEES
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant proffered an
offer of judgment to plaintiff of $24,000.00 on or about August 12, 1992. Since plaintiffs
judgment is not more favorable than defendant's $24,000.00 offer, plaintiff must pay
defendant's costs incurred after the making of the offer. Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq. and
Richard L. Peel, Esq., counsel for defendant, have submitted affidavits in support of
attorney's fees generated since August 12, 1992. The court finds the amount set forth to be
fair and reasonable under the circumstances; $2,360.00 for the legal services of Mr. Peel and
$2,289 for legal services rendered by Ms. Brown. Plaintiff is obligated to pay $4,649.00.
The court finds that both the plaintiff and defendant are in need of financial assistance
and, thereby, orders that each pay respective attorney's fees except as set forth above.
Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from and against the defendant, the same to
become final and absolute upon signing by the court and entry by the clerk in the Registry of
Actions. Plaintiff is also entitled to the restoration of her maiden name.
Counsel have submitted proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
in connection with this case. Upon review, defendant's proposal most closely reflects the
ruling of the court except for the attorney's fee issue.
The court directs counsel for the defendant to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of
18
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law and decree of divorce consistent with the foregoing decision of the Court and the
stipulation of the parties received at trial.
DATED AT PROVO, UTAH, this Jgfday of September, 1992.

BY THE COURT
\\

8

mz^>.

ige Lynn W. Davis
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH

JANET R. COX,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 904402060
K. NORMAN COX,
Defendant.

Judge Lynn W. Davis

I hereby certify that I caused to mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the court's Decision on September 28, 1992, to the following:
Gary Weight, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
ALDRIDGE, NELSON, WTEGHT & ESPLTN
P.O. Box L
Provo, UT 84603
Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
ROBINSON, SEILER, GLAZIER & BROWN
80 North 100 East
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 1266
Richard L.- Peel, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
228 S. Fourth Street
Las Vegas, NV 89101
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MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 south Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-1162

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
p

JANET R. COX,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL^

-VS-

Civil No.

904402060

K. NORMAN COX,

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendant.

PLAINTIFF TO

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED

counsel of record, Mary
final Judgment

C.

Decree of

Corporon,
Divorce in

ACTION, by and through her
hereby

appeals

from the

the above-entitled action;

entered on or about October 28, 1992.
DATED THIS f^T

day of A^O V T£ /Y\b£\_

/

CORPORON & WILLIAMS

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Plaintiff

1992.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY

that

I

am

employed

in

the

offices of

Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that
I caused

the

defendant by

foregoing
placing a

NOTICE
true and

OF

APPEAL

to

be

served upon

correct copy of the same in an

envelope addressed to:
MARILYN MOODY BROWN
Attorney for Defendant
80 North 100 East
Provo, Utah 84606
RICHARD PEEL
Attorney for Defendant
228 South Fourth Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
and depositing
paid thereon,

the same,
in the

on the _ 2 j T d a y of

sealed, with

first-class postage pre-

United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah
AJO

u^^Qgy
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, 1992.

APPENDIX "E"
Antenuptial Property Agreement

C©F/
ANTENUPTIAL PROPERTY AGREEMENT
Antenuptial Agreement made this 3C^T1 day of OlMflQ
19 £8 , between KENNETH NORMAN COX, an adult, hereinafter
referred to as prospective husband, and JANET J. REX, an adult,
hereinafter referred to as prospective wife, in consideration of
the contemplated marriage of the above-named parties.
RECITALS
A. A marriage-is intended and desired to be solemnized
between the parties hereto.
B. Each of the parties is possessed of property which they
separately own or have an interest in their own individual right.
C. Each of the parties has made a full disclosure to the
other party of all of his or her property and assets and of the
value thereof, and this Agreement is entered into with a full
knowledge on the part of each as to the extent and probable value
of the estate of the other, and of all the rights conferred by
law on each in- the estate of the other by virtue of such proposed
marriage.
D. In4anticipation of such marriage the parties desire to
fix and determine the rights of each of them in any and all
property of every nature and description and wheresoever located
that the other of them may own or have an interest in at the time
of such marriage or may acquire thereafter.
E. Each of the parties mutually desires to retain, manage
or dispose separately by gift, will or otherwise all of. his or
her estate to the same extent as if each of such parties remained
single.
In consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein,
the parties agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
Each of the parties hereto shall retain the title, management and control of the estates now owned by each of them,
whether real, personal or mixed, and all increase or addition
thereto, entirely free and unmolested by the other party and may
encumber, sell, dispose, give or provide by will for the disposition of any or all of such estates so separately owned and
possessed. At the death of either no claim by inheritance, descent, surviving spouse award, homestead, dower or maintenance

shall be made by either of the parties hereto against the other
or against the estate of the other.
ARTICLE II
Each of the parties hereto separately waives any and all
rights by dower, homestead, surviving spouse award, inheritance,
descent or any other marital right arising by virtue of statute
or otherwise in and to any parcel of the estate now owned and
possessed by the other, and does hereby agree and consent that
each shall have full power and control in all respects to exercise free and undisputed ownership, management and disposition of
each of such estates and increases thereto now owned and possessed by the parties, and each of such parties does waive and
renounce any legal and statutory rights that might, under any
law, be set up against any part of the estate of the other and
does consent that the estate of each shall descend or be disposed
of by will or otherwise to the heirs or legatees or devisees of
each of the parties, free and clear of any claim by inheritance,
dower, surviving spouse award or homestead or maintenance or any
claim otherwise given bylaw to a husband and wife.
ARTICLE" III
This Agreement shall not in any manner, bar or affect, the
right of either party to claim and receive any property of any
nature or character that the other party hereto, by last will, or
by any other instrument, may give, devise, bequeath, transfer or
assign to the other party hereto.
ARTICLE IV
If either party shall mortgage, pledge, or sell and convey,
his or her real or personal estate, whether in whole or in part,
the other party hereto shall, upon demand, from time to time join
in any and every mortgage, or deed of conveyance, or in any other
instrument that may be necessary or desirable to make the same
effectual.
ARTICLE V
In the event that at any time during the existence of the
marital relationship between the parties, they should be or
become residents of a state under the laws of which husband and
wife acquire property interests commonly known as community
property or any other property and interests different from the
property interests of husband and wife under the laws of the
State of Utah, their property interests shall nevertheless remain
2

the same as they would have been under the terms of this agreement construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah,
and the parties will each, at any time during or after the termination of the marital relationship, execute and deliver any and
all deeds and other instruments desirable or necessary to transfer any right, title or interest, in any property or estate of
the other which they may acquire by virtue of any so-called
community property laws to the persons who would otherwise be
entitled thereto by virtue of this Agreement.
ARTICLE VI
If the prospective husband shall survive the prospective
wife, the prospective husband shall not, as surviving husband,
make any claim to any part, or share, of the real and/or personal
estate of which the prospective wife may die seized or possessed.
The prospective husband, in consideration of such marriage,
hereby expressly waives and relinquishes all right in and to the
real property of which the prospective wife may die seized, as
well as all right in and to the personal estate of the prospective wife, or a surviving husband, heir-at-law, or otherwise.
ARTICLE^ VII
If the prospective wife shall survive the prospective husband , she shall not, as surviving wife, make any claim to any
part, or share, of the real and/or personal estate of which the
prospective husband may die seized or possessed. The prospective
wife hereby waives and relinquishes all claims to an allowance,
homestead, widow's award, or any other right in and to the real
and/or personal estate of which the prospective husband may die
seized or possessed.
ARTICLE VIII
Neither party hereto, by virtue of such marriage, shall
have, or acquire, any-right, title cr claim in and to the real or
personal estate of the other, that the estate of each shall
descend to or vest in his or her, heirs-at-law, legatees, or
devisees, as may be prescribed by his or her last will and
testament, or in default of such last will and testament, by the
law then in force, as though no marriage had ever taken place
between the parties.
ARTICLE IX
**

This Agreement is entered into by the parties hereto with
full knowledge on the part of each of the extent and probable
3

value of all of the property or estate of the other, and of all
rights that, but for this Agreement, would be conferred by law
upon each of them in the property or estate of the other, by
virtue of the consummation of the proposed marriage, and the
rights of the respective parties hereto in and to each other's
property, or estate, of whatsoever character the same may be,
shall be determined, fixed and settled by this Agreement, and not
otherwise• Prospective husband represents that, on the date of
this Agreement, the approximate value of his property and assets
is THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND AND NO/100 POLLARDS 380,000.00
) .
Prospective wife represents that, on the date of this Agreement,
the approximate value of her property and assets is SEVENTY
THOUSAND ANH NO/100 HOI I ARS

( $ 7Q.000,00

)•

ARTICLE X

This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement between the
parties relating to their antenuptial property arrangements.
There are no oral Agreements between the parties respecting such
antenuptial property arrangements. Any alteration or modification of this Agreement must be in writing, signed and acknowledged by each of the parties hereto.
ARTICLE XT
This Agreement shall bind the parties hereto and their
respective heirs, administrators and assigns, and shall become
effective only upon the consummation of the proposed marriage
between the parties hereto, and if such marriage does not take
place, this Agreement shall be null and void.
ARTICLE XII
The parties hereto both stipulate that they, and each of
them, were represented by legal counsel of their choice in the
preparation of..this Agreement; that they have read this Agreement
and have had its contents explained,, and to each of them, by such
counsel; and that they fully understand the terms, provisions,
and legal consequences of this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement
at Provo, Utah, the day and year first above written.

Ckf:
'KENNETH
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NORMAN^JCOX

'

/

%n«<i^)/P^

JANJflT" J- K E ^

STATE OF UTAH

)

ss.
COUNTY OF U T A H

)

On .Tunc 30 \<m
m, personally appeared before m e
KENNETH NORMAN C0X f o n e of the signers of the foregoing
instrument, w h o duly acknowledged t o m e that h e executed th$, ,i#
same.
^ ^--'^X
Jt)TARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:
Residing A t :

STATE OF UTAH

:

- ':
--.

••-_:*

J\
r

' ,\^ .•>'
o f *••*

)

ss.
COUNTY OF U T A H

)

June 28, 1988
., personally appeared before m e
On
JANET J. REX, one of t h e signers o f t h e foregoing instrument, who
duly acknowledged to m e that she executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
August 14, 1991
My Commission Expires:
Residing A t :
.. Provo, Utah
' M41

RTIFICATION OF ATTORNEY
certify that I am a licensed
..ixttect to practice law in t h e State of Utah; that I
have corisultea>-w4Lth KENNETH NORMAN COX, who is a party to t h e
foregoing Agreement, and that I have fully advised him o f h i s
property rights and t h e legal significance of the foregoing
Agreement; a n d that KENNETH NORMAN COX has acknowledged h i s full
5

and complete understanding of the legal consequences and of the
terms and provisions of the foregoing Agreement—and has freely
and voluntarily executed the Agreement in my^ presei

STATE OF UTAH
:ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH
mi personally appeared before me
., Attorney at law, signer of the
ris
abovee iinstrument,
who duly acknowledged to me that he exec^teed*^
v
the same.
^PM/^'S
0^

On

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expire^:
Residing At:

mv/i \Wh

-" mm m

\*r
•„, c

• ^ 1

Or ^

%
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'"•MHHM**

CERTIFICATION OF ATTORNEY
I, DOUGLAS A. NIELSON, certify that I am a licensed
attorney, admitted to practice law in the State of Utah; that I
have consulted with JANET J. REX, who is a party to the foregoing
Agreement, and that I have fully advised her of her property
rights and the legal significance of the foregoing Agreement; and
that JANET J. REX has acknowledged her full and complete understanding of the legal consequences and of the terms and provisions of the foregoing Agreement anq^-has freely and voluntarily
executed the Agreement in my presence

STATE OF UTAH
:ss,
COUNTY OF UTAH

On
June 28, 1988
t personally appeared before me
DOUGLAS A. NIELSON, Attorney at law, signer of the above.
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
I
My Commission Expires:
Residing At:
Provo, Utah

August 14, 1991
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APPENDIX "P»
Warranty Deed

sH. * 3 7 C 2

?K 2 3 2 2 P<5 7 9 4 -

•>:>(* 3 «£:D UTAH C2LHTY GORGES Zlr
1*23 .UN 30 3 : ; i An FEE 3 . 0 0
'ECQRDEO FOR DOUGLAS A NIELSON

P£f. &.#fo

WARRANTY DEED

NORMAN COX, grantor, hereby CONVEYS and WARRANTS to NORMAN
COX and JANET J. REX, as joint tenants with full rights of
survivor- ship and not as tenants in common, grantees, of 773
Soutn 400 East, Orem, Utah, for the sum of TEN DOLLARS ($10.00)
and other valuable consideration, the following described real
property situated in Utah County, State of Utah:
Commencing in the intersection of the East Boundary of 400
East Street, Orem, Utah,#and the grantors South fence line
extended, said point being 207.90 feet North and 43.40 feet
East of the Center of Section 23, Township 6 South, Range
2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North along the
East boundary of said Street 66.00 feet; thence South 88•
55' East along a fence line extended and a fence line 2 41.35
feet to the grantors East fence line; thence South 0 # 44'
West along said East fence line 65.50 feet to the said South
fence line; thence North 89* 02' West along said fence line
and fence line extended 241.00 feet to the point of beginning.
Together with all appurtenances thereunto belonging.
This deed is hereby made expressly subject to all existing
and recorded restrictions, exceptions, reservations, easements,
rights-of-way, conditions, liens, encumbrances, and covenants of
whatever nature, if any, and is expressly subject to all municipal, city, county, and state zoning laws and other ordinances,
regulations, and restrictions, including statutes and other laws
of municipal, county, or other governmental authorities applicable to and enforceable against the premises described herein.
WITNESS the hands of wsaid grantors this

/A/

,

/ ^r

dav of

, 19 * *—.

y

/V

NORMAN COX

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH
On

)
: ss.
)
Jure 29, 4?88

, personally appeared before

EXHIBIT ^

3

£HT1S702

SK 2 5 2 2 ?Q 7 9 ?

me NORMAN COX, t h e s i g n e r of t h e w i t h i n i n s t r u m e n t , who d u l y
acknowledged t o me t h a t he e x e c u t e d t h e same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission E x p i r e s : August U , 1991
3
R e s i d i n g At:
rovo,, Utan
WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO:
D o u g l a s A.
tfielson
3 319 ttorrh U n i v e r s i t y Avenue, S u i t e 200
P r o v o , Utah 84604
MAIL TAX NOTICE TO:
Granrees

773 South 400 East
Oremf Utah 34058

I*

. * 1 '--C;j
x.

AFFIDAVIT CF SURVIVING JOINT TENANT
iHTlSTOl
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss

COUNTY CF UTAH

)

5K 2 3 ^ 2 *G 7

NINA 3 *£:0 UTAH COUNT?"RECORDED
19SS JUN 30 *:43 AH ?rr i ^ g f
RECORDED FGR CCUGLAS A MIELSQH

NORMAN COX, of legal age, being duly sworn, deposes and
says:
Thar RUBY GURR DUKE COX, the decedent mentioned in the
attached certified copy of Certificate of Death, is the sane
person as RUBY S. cox", named as one of the parties in that
certain Quit-Claim Deed dated November 6, 1967, executed by MARY
ANN DUKE, FENTON J- ?RINCE and LILLIAN T. PRINCE, recorded as
Entry No. 7627, in Book _LLLZ_/ Page
73
of official records
of Utah County, State of Utah, concerning the real property
situated in the County of Utah, State of Utah and described as
follows:
Commencing in the intersection of the East Boundary of 4 00
East Street, Orem, Utah, and the grantors South fence line
extended, said point being 207.90
feet North and 43.40 feet
East of the Center of Section 23, Township 6 South, Range
2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North along the
East boundary of said Street 66.00 feet; thence South 88*
55' East along a fence line extended and a fence line 241.35
feet to the grantors East fence line; thence South 0 # 44'
West along said East fence line 65.50 feet to the said South
fence line; thence North 89* 02' West along said fence line
and fence line extended 241.00 feet to the point of beginning.
DATED this

*

s?

day of

J
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^

NORMAN COX
773 South 400 East
Orem, Utah
3 4 053
Telephone: (301) 225-:

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

: ss.
)

On the
2ftt?i day of
June
, 19 53 ,
personally appeared before me NORMAN COX, tne signer cf the
within and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that
he executed the same.
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Notary P u b l i c
August 14, 1991
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